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Abstract  
 This paper focuses on investigating the syntax and semantics of 
possessive constructions in A Clergyman’s Daughter at the phrasal level, 
within the framework of cognitive grammar using Heine’s (1997) model of 
possessives. The study aims at analyzing the various semantic relations in 
possessive constructions from a cognitive grammar perspective, and showing 
that possession does have a privileged status in the semantics of other 
concepts. This, however, proves the fallacy of the traditional view. It also 
shows that there is a natural and systematic relationship between possessive 
constructions and cognitive constructional schemas that give rise to them 
through conceptual transfer, and are motivated by experiential gestalt. No 
model alone can account for all semantic relations expressed through 
prototypical possessive. After analyzing possessive structures using Heine’s 
(1997) classification of possessives, there remains a group of other semantic 
relations that Heine (1997) could not have given a label; they are 
uncategorized. For underlying grammatical structures of these possessives, 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) model is used, which propose that aspects of the 
experiential gestalt motivate the wider use of too complex possessive 
constructions. 
 
Keywords: Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Grammar, Possessives 
Structures, Event Schemas, Experiential Gestalt 
 
1. Introduction  
      Possession seems to be one of the central concepts of human cognition. 
In traditional approaches, the notion of possession is considerably unclear; 
they fail inherently to provide a natural satisfactory explanation of how the 
European Scientific Journal February 2019 edition Vol.15, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
216 
same morpheme comes to express highly diverse semantic relations. First, 
traditional grammarians divide the meanings expressed by possessive 
constructions (PCs hereafter) into various sub-groups and treat these as 
homonymous, in that the different semantic relations are not related to each 
other, only structurally they are the same. Actually, Quirk et al. (1985, p.322) 
admitted that their semantic classification “is in part arbitrary”. Second, 
representatives of the structuralist school and some modern syntacticians, like 
Chomsky (2002), assume that there is some abstract meaning which is general 
enough to cover all the various uses of the genitive. This abstract/general 
meaning shows the unity of the genitive constructions without coinciding 
with any of them in meaning, that is, the process of “understanding a 
sentence” can be explained in terms of the notion of linguistic level (p.92). 
The data collected from the novel proves how the traditional approaches are 
wrong and thus contradict the data. 
     The dissatisfaction with these aspects of traditional approaches motivate 
cognitivists to claim that the grammatical structure of possessives is 
predictable to a large extent once people know the range of possible cognitive 
structures from which they are derived. Consequently, there is also an 
assumption that possessive expressions are seen as a matter of conceptual 
integration of the semantic structures of the two component items, namely: 
possessor and possessum (PR-PM hereafter). 
     A crucial research question is how cognitive grammar implements 
cognitive abilities in conceptualizing a range of semantic relations expressed 
through typical PCs. Another research question is how and why there are so 
many different relations expressed by PCs only, not by any other nominal 
structures. A third important question is why PCs can be traced back to other 
domains of human experience. 
     It is hypothesized that there are some concepts in language for which there 
is no grammatical structure because they are too abstract and complex. As a 
result, the speakers use the same constructions used for expressing notional 
possession and ownership due to aspects of similarity. It is hypothesized that 
Heine’s (1997a, 1997b) model can account for all PCs. Another hypothesis is 
that grammar does not always reflect what is in the minds of the speaker. In 
language, there are highly abstract concepts which grammar cannot 
conceptualize. Thus, such concepts are generally conceptualized by structures 
of some concrete or less abstract concepts with which they have some affinity. 
 
2. Literature Review  
      Numerous cognitive linguistic studies have conducted research on how 
and why the very same nominal possessive structure is used to express other 
concepts that have nothing to do with possession. However, to the best of the 
current researchers’ knowledge, so far no research has been conducted 
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regarding the analysis of various PCs in any literary works by Orwell or any 
other modern novelist. Thus, the present research is an attempt to fill in this 
gap and its insights provide a cognitive grammatical account for the PCs in 
Orwell’s A Clergyman’s Daughter or in any other authentic and modern 
literary works in general.  
 
3. Possessive Constructions in Cognitive Grammar  
     Possessive expressions are neither integrated at random nor conditioned 
by formal rules. The integration of the subparts of a composite structure is 
governed by valence determinants and conceptual relations. Valence is the 
capacity of two structures to combine. One significant determinant resides in 
the phonological and semantic compatibility between the subparts of an 
expression. Every construction, whether lexical or grammatical, is 
characterized as an assembly of symbolic structures (Langacker, 1993). 
 
3.1 Langacker’s Reference-Point Construction  
     The reference-point analysis offers a detailed account of the identification 
mechanism set up within possessive NPs. Langacker argued that, 
conceptually, there is not really an “extra” argument. The reference point 
model is based on “our basic cognitive ability to invoke one entity [the PR] 
as a reference point for establishing mental contact with another [the PM]” 
(1995, p.27; Payne & Barshi, 1999, p.12). The relationship between the 
reference point and the “target” (=PM) is just a special case of metonymy, 
and thus one might further argue that there is no real “extra” argument. This 
is, of course, most persuasive in the case of part-whole relationship and 
inalienable possession. Since the aim of using a reference-point construction 
is to make a target entity more accessible by tying it to a reference point, 
Taylor argued that it is to be expected that the reference-point should be more 
easily mentally accessible than the target, as “it would be perverse indeed to 
invoke a less accessible entity to aid the identification of a more accessible 
entity” (Taylor,1996, p.210). 
 
3.2  Lakoff and Johnson’s Model of Possessive Constructions  
     Possession is analyzed as an experiential gestalt, in the sense of Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980). Aspects of the experiential gestalt motivate the wider use 
of the possessive construction. The baseline of this theory was laid by Lakoff 
and Johnson in their Metaphors We Live By (1980). According to Lakoff and 
Johnson as well as their followers, a certain concept fit into an experience 
through conceptual metaphor. Metaphor by itself is conceptualizing and 
experiencing one domain, called target domain, in terms of another, known 
as source domain. Lakoff and Johnson’s monograph is also regarded as the 
birth date of cognitive linguistics, cognitive semantics, and cognitive 
European Scientific Journal February 2019 edition Vol.15, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
218 
grammar to explain why PCs are structured the way they are. Cognitive 
semantics has been reinforcing the fact that metaphor is pervasive. It is a 
cognitive issue and the nature of human conceptual system is metaphorical in 
both thinking and acting. Thus, linguistic expressions are based on these 
conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
     To Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p.5), “the essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. The 
conceptual metaphor theory has been considered as the cornerstone of the 
cognitive semantics to represent the relationship between language, mind, and 
embodied experience (Evans, 2007; cf. Evans & Green, 2006).  
 
4. Heine’s Model of Possessive Constructions  
     Apart from the two models mentioned above, there is also Heine’s model 
that the study uses for analyzing the PCs extracted from the novel. According 
to Heine (1997a), possession belongs to the kind of concepts that tend to be 
described as being inherently vague and fuzzy. PCs are used for a wide range 
of contents. This is why Heine claimed that linguistic expressions for 
possession are meaningless, that is, English items like –s, of, and have are 
semantically empty. They are called ‘colorless’ because the possessive 
concepts expressed by them are said to be indeterminate. Heine (1997a) 
argued that the relationship each PC expresses is so versatile and it is tempting 
to claim that any relationship between two entities can be expressed as 
possessive. In addition, possessive expressions are likely to have other, non-
possessive, meanings. For example, there is no doubt that the sentences in 1a 
and 1b are instance of possessions, but  1c-d are not (Heine, 1997a): 
(1)   a. Ron has a parrot.                                                              
     b. They have a company. 
     c. A tree has leaves.                                          
     d. Who has the exact time? 
     Observe the oddness of the verb have in 1c and 1d, which can appear in a 
wide variety of contexts, and express a variety of very different relations. 
Alternative terms such as ‘relational,’ ‘associative,’ and the like have been 
proposed to refer to concepts that include possession but are not confined to 
it. Heine claimed that possessive relation can comprise any relationship which 
may feasibly hold between a PR and a PM, and which may at times resemble 
the notion of ownership only superficially. To illustrate that, Heine gave the 
example of the attributive possessive relation Suzanne’s car to refer, for 
example, to a car that Suzanne wanted to buy but never did, or to a car that 
she sold, or to a car that she saw, mentioned, etc. In short, it may denote 
possession, but it may also stand for meanings that bear no discernible 
relationship to possession (Heine, 1997b).  
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4.1 Alienable and Inalienable Possessive Constructions  
     Heine (1997a) observed that the PM is regarded as either inalienable or 
alienable to the PR. According to him, there are two kinds of possessions 
generally; inalienable and alienable possession. The inalienable category, for 
example, has also been called ‘intimate’ or ‘inherent’. Superficially, the 
distinction is a straightforward one; items that cannot normally be separated 
from their owners are inalienable, while alienable possessions are those with 
whom it is possible, in some way, to sever or terminate the relationship of 
possession (e.g. through loss, sale, or theft). Thus, items belonging to any of 
the following conceptual domains are likely to be treated as inalienable 
(Heine, 1997a): 
1. Kinship terms 
2. Body-parts 
3. Relational spatial concepts, like top, bottom, and interior, etc. 
4. Inherent parts of other items, like branch, roof, and handle, etc. 
5. Physical and mental states, like strength, thought, idea, and fear, etc. 
6. Nominalizations, where the PM is a verbal noun, for example ‘his 
singing’, ‘the planting of bananas’. 
7. OTHER Individual concepts, like name, voice, smell, shadow, footprint, 
property, and home. 
   
4.2 Source Domains for Possessives: Event Schemas  
     According to Heine (1997b), complex contents are expressed by means of 
less complex and more basic contents, and abstract concepts are expressed by 
means of more concrete concepts. Grammatical concepts are fairly abstract; 
they do not refer to physical objects or kinetic processes, and they are defined 
primarily with reference to their relative function in discourse.  
     Event schemas are propositional in nature, and they are abstracted from 
the way people experience their environment and describe their experiences 
when communicating with other members. There is no evidence to suggest 
that event schemas are innate structures. What Comrie (1981) observed on 
language universals is that “innateness remains empty because it is just a 
name given to the set of language universals, and using this name should not 
blind us to the fact that a name is not an explanation” (p.24). Event schemas 
provide the structural templates of transfer (Heine, 1997b).  
     Heine (1997a) concluded that possession is a complex concept. That is 
why the realization is derived from more concrete and basic concepts, as 
distinguished from a simple relational concept. It thus seems that for Heine, 
there is no basic concept of possession, and all possessive predicates must be 
derived from one of the eight source event schemas he defines. The syntax of 
PCs is not distinct from canonical syntactic patterns within the language. He 
also suggested that the event schemas illustrated in Table 1 below, adapted 
from Heine (1997a, p.91), have cognitively distinct ways of conceptualizing 
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eventualities which come to overlap in meaning with the domain of 
possession via a process of grammaticalization, that is, PCs may be 
interpreted in terms of these schemas but not necessarily identical ways 
depending on the exact semantic contribution of those pieces (Heine, 1997a). 
    Table 1. A formulaic description of event schemas used as sources for PCs 
Formula Label of Event 
Schema 
X takes Y  (what one does)         Action 
Y is located at X  (where one is) Location 
X is with Y (whom one is with)      Companion 
X’s Y exists (Being things around people)         Genitive 
Y exists for/to X   (existence)          Goal 
Y exists from X  (existence)         Source 
As for X, Y exists  (existence)           Topic 
Y is X’s (property)        Equation 
              Note: X stands for ‘possessor’ and Y stands for ‘Possessum’. 
 
4.3 Alienable Possessive Constructions in ‘A Clergyman’s Daughter’  
     All instances of alienable type of possession in A Clergyman’s Daughter 
are divided into three subcategories: animate alienable, unowned alienable, 
and inanimate alienable possessions. Animate alienable possession concepts 
are basic and typical PCs from the possession gestalt. In concepts of 
possession, the PMs are not semantically dependent on the PRs, that is, there 
is no conceptual dependency between the two entities. The following are 
extracted examples from 1935/2002 (p.42) and 1935/2002 (p.204), 
respectively: 
 A peaceful plume of smoke floated upwards from the 
Rector’s pipe. He was gazing with a meditative eye at the steel 
engraving of Charles I and had probably forgotten already about 
Dorothy’s demand for money. 
About half an hour later they reappeared in Mr Warburton’s 
car, which was packed out of the front gate, and drove off in the 
direction of the Ipswich road.                                                                                     
In the above examples, the PMs ‘pipe’ and ‘car’ are not inherently 
relational to the PRs. Conceptualization of these entities need not invoke any 
specific relation to ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’. There is, therefore, no 
referent inherent in the semantic structure of the PRs which could function as 
an optimal reference point in terms of conceptual dependency. In these 
examples, ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are humans, and humans have 
maximal cognitive salience, that is, the schematic characterization of these 
phrases is based on the reference-point model. The PRs are conceived in 
relation to the PMs, via the speakers’ mental contact and conscious 
awareness. ‘The Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are salient, informative, and 
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intrinsic to serve as mental address for ‘pipe’ and ‘car’. For example, people 
who typically form their experience from moment to moment realize that 
‘pipe’ and ‘car’ have to be possessed and related to individuals. People 
generally do not think of the world as being populated by material things 
when no one bears ownership to them, each of which has a person attached. 
Rather, they think of the world as being populated by people and animals. 
These factors point to a clear asymmetry in which owners are natural 
reference-points, and this leads to the identification of ‘pipe’ and ‘car’ 
(Langacker, 1993). 
     Syntactically and semantically speaking, these two instances are originally 
derived from Location construction. This natural systematic process of 
structuralizing concepts through concept transfer shows that human language 
is actually a natural process. Thus, the phrases come from the semantics of 
location construction; when someone says “a car is located at Mr Warburton’s 
house”, “a pipe is located at the Rector’s house”, these basically mean that 
‘Mr Warburton has a car and the Rector has a pipe’. A speaker indirectly 
conveys his message of referring to the fact that ‘Mr Warburton’ owns a ‘car’ 
and ‘the Rector owns a ‘pipe’. According to the Possession-as-Location 
(PAL) hypothesis, possession relation is a type of location relation; the 
morphosyntactic similarities that hold between possessive and locative 
structures should be attributed to similarity at the conceptual level and not  at 
the linguistic level (Heine,1997a,1997b).What motivates a speaker to infer 
the originality of the phrase from Location Schema is this similarity of 
meaning. The ‘car’ and ‘pipe’ are typically located in the proximity of ‘Mr 
Warburton’ and ‘the Rector’; thus, they have full rights of access to them. 
Moreover, in the Location Schema, ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are 
conceptualized as the place that ‘the pipe’ and ‘car’ are located in/at. Even 
though possessive constructions may differ from locative constructions 
syntactically or semantically, they are locative in nature (Heine, 1997a). 
     Unowned PCs are less typical than strict PCs from possession gestalt. This 
is because in these concepts, PRs do not own the PMs and they do not 
necessarily express possession, but they convey accidental possession or 
temporary control. According to this notion, the PR can dispose the PM for a 
limited time but cannot claim ownership to it. However, the phrases behave 
in accordance with typical PC in virtue of some kind of similarity with at least 
one of the aspects of the prototype. Below is one of the instances extracted 
from the novel (1935/2002, p.193): 
 There was only one water tap in the camp, and that was two 
hundred yards from Dorothy’s hut, and the unspeakable earth latrine 
was at the same distance. It was a life that wore you out, used up every 
ounce of your energy…. 
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     Dorothy’s hut is derivative of the cognitive forces that give rise to it. This 
unowned possessive concept which is linguistically shaped can be extended 
to refer to other concepts of Location and Companion Schemas. Dorothy’s 
hut tends to share semantic similarities with the concepts these schemas 
convey. The ‘hut’ is typically described as being, existing or located, at the 
location and in the proximity of ‘Dorothy,’ occupying the same location for 
an extended period of time. This means that ‘Dorothy’ has control over the 
‘hut’, and that she has given full rights of access to use it, but she does not 
own it. Likewise, the phrase can also be understood in terms of ‘something 
being accompanied by,’ the pragmatic sense of an utterance, like “Dorothy 
was there with a hut” and this means that ‘Dorothy’ is seen in a ‘hut’ next to 
her. Since the ‘hut’ is close to her, ‘Dorothy’ uses it, but does not necessarily 
own it. This conceptual transfer comes into play because the speakers have 
already experienced what concepts of “something located close to someone” 
and “being with” mean. The same goes for Cargill’s accountant (Heine, 
1997a, 1997b). 
     Last but not the least, inanimate alienable possession concepts are non-
prototypical PC from the possession gestalt in the sense that the PR is an 
inanimate thing and the PM is something that is relative to the PR. Very few 
instances concerning this class have occurred through the novel. One of the 
instances is shown below (1935/2002, p.198): 
 Mr Cairns, a stiff built man with grey whiskers, and two farm 
hands, were keeping guard over the stolen property that had been dug 
out of the straw of Nobby’s hut. 
     In this example, ‘Nobby’s hut’, as the whole, has informativity and cue 
validity to the conceptualization of ‘the straw’. This is because ‘Nobby’s hut’ 
is saliently and naturally lending itself to reference-point function since it is 
ubiquitous perceptually in human experience. In such concepts, ‘the straw’ is 
not semantically dependent on ‘Nobby’s hut’. The PM do not constituent an 
inherent part or things to the PR. ‘The straw’ is just an object put inside ‘the 
hut’. Conceptualization of the PM need not invoke any specific relation to the 
PR in terms of inseparability. Therefore, one can refer to ‘the straw’ without 
even giving reference to the PR. Humans cognitive ability detects the valence 
relation between the two entities, that finally leads to the conceptual 
integration mechanism for the two entities. In these two instances, speakers 
know very well the semantic realization of both entities, which pave a way 
for a semantic integration of both entities together and make an asymmetrical 
alignment for the speech production (Taylor, 1996). 
     The straw of Nobby’s hut is the interpretation of locative construction, 
because there is a kind of relation between the two entities in terms of location 
and closeness. ‘The straw’ is located relative to the ‘Nobby’s hut’ which 
means that ‘the straw’ is in close distance and is located in ‘the hut’. 
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Moreover, a descriptive utterance of “a hut with a straw,” hints at the 
pragmatic reading of ‘a hut contains a straw’. As a result, ‘the straw’ is with 
‘the hut’ and one can find a ‘straw’ near ‘the hut’. Typically, ‘the straw’ is a 
comitative complement to the ‘Nobby’s hut’ subject. In accompaniment 
schema, the subject is typically the PR, the object is the PM, and the predicate 
marks the possessive relationship. This systematic process of constructional 
schemas stands in great opposition with modularism, because the nature of 
human brains, bodies, and environments constrains and shapes what and how 
people understand and reason. The same goes for the bank’s money (Heine, 
1997a). 
 
4.4 Inalienable Possessive Constructions in ‘A Clergyman’s Daughter’ 
      From the point of view of Heine as a cognitivist, in inalienable 
possessions, the relationship between the PR and the PM is determined by the 
meaning of the PM. Also, relations on nouns are often referred as analogous 
to the thematic relations of verbs and their arguments. 
 
4.4.1 Kinship Terms 
     In kinship terms, the PMs are semantically dependent on the PRs, that is, 
it is a requirement of the PMs that they be the kind of kin to somebody. 
Generally, humans’ cognitive ability reflects this great conceptual closeness 
of someone being close and relative to someone else. In fact, the speaker starts 
with the intention of referring to the PM, and then selects the PR most 
appropriate to this purpose. Consider the following example (1935/2002, 
p.459): 
She paused to think of fresh items. Mrs J. was Mrs Jowett, the 
blacksmith’s wife; she came sometimes to be churched after her 
babies were born, but only if you coaxed her tactfully beforehand. 
     This example shows unprofiled relations. Hearers know very well from 
their cognitive ability that ‘wife’ is conceptually dependent on the PR. It is 
not intrinsic as their conceptualizations need to make reference to ‘the 
blacksmith’. So it is almost obligatory of ‘wife’ that she be a ‘wife’ of 
somebody. This semantic dependency forces kinship terms to never appear 
without a PR (Taylor, 1996). 
     In this instance, one can find out that the relations people have by blood 
are permanent and show semantic relationships of closeness between the 
individuals. So, it is easier for a speaker to adjust a connection between 
location and possession, that is, possession as location in the sense that ‘the 
blacksmith’ is a location at the linguistic level, and that possessive and 
locative sentences have the same syntactic and conceptual structure. 
Situations in which objects are always or often close to a person provoke the 
implicature that they belong to that person, that is, ‘wife’ is typically 
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described as being, existing or located, at the location and in the proximity of 
‘the blacksmith’. The same example can also be taken from accompaniment 
schema. This is because when people say “here comes the blacksmith with a 
wife,” they basically mean that there is an intimate relation between the two. 
So, in this case, speakers convey more than they say via a conversational 
implicature. The examples are also derived from Topic Schema in the sense 
that ‘the blacksmith’ functions as a possessive modifiers by appearing in topic 
position. In effect, the possessive relationship is established by asserting the 
existence of the ‘wife’ in relation to the topicalised PR; as far as ‘the 
blacksmith’ is concerned, there is a ‘wife’ (Heine, 1997a, 1997b). 
 
4.4.2 Body-Parts  
     In body-part terms, the PMs are also semantically dependent on the PRs, 
that is, it is a requirement of the PMs that they be an inherent part of whole. 
Thus, the parts are thought to represent the whole, and the whole is intrinsic 
to the conceptualization of the part. The following is an instance of this class 
(1935/2002, p.61): 
He pinched Dorothy’s bare elbow–she had changed, after breakfast, 
into a sleeveless gingham frock. Dorothy stepped hurriedly backwards 
to get out of his reach…. 
     In this example, ‘bare elbow’ is defined with respect to a typical 
individual, which consists of a nose, two eyes, two ears, a mouth and so on. 
‘Dorothy’ has maximal cognitive salience. People typically do not have 
individual awareness of body parts, such as ‘bare elbow’, except as they relate 
to whole individuals. People generally do not think of the world as being 
populated by such, each of which has a person or other animate beings 
attached. Rather, they think of the world as being populated by people and 
animals, and they become aware of the particular parts only in the context of  
‘Dorothy’ (Taylor, 1996). 
     Most importantly, the original meaning and structure of this instance is 
originally taken from Accompaniment schema, because the semantic 
relations expressed by body-part possessives are so related to the concrete 
meaning of ‘one is with something.’ The pragmatic sense of the Companion 
schema ‘someone is accompanied by something’ hints at the fact that when 
someone is in an accompaniment of something, it mainly gives the concrete 
meaning of someone being in a very close distance with the thing that is 
accompanied. Without this source schema, there would not have occurred a 
natural and systematic way of giving meaning to whatever concepts is in the 
minds of speakers. This is basically because meaning is in the minds of 
speakers as conceptualizations of the concrete embodied experiences. So, the 
body-part PCs are basically influenced by a real factor. The PR is described 
as having a bare elbow. So, its meaning and structure are derived from a 
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concrete structure, like “Dorothy with bare elbow”, in the sense that ‘bare 
elbow’ is a comitative complement and ‘Dorothy’ is a subject (Heine, 1997a, 
1997b). 
 
4.4.3 Relational Spatial Concepts 
     In Relational spatial concepts, the PMs are semantically dependent on the 
PRs, because there is an inherent semantic spatial relationship between the 
two entities. This implies that the PMs constitute an inherent spatial side to 
the PR. The following two examples of this kind are extracted from the novel 
1935/2002 (p.82) and 1935/2002 (p.301), respectively: 
She took Dorothy between her large, gnarled hands, whose knuckles 
were as shiny as skinned onions from age and ceaseless washing up, 
and gave her a wet kiss. Then she drew her into the unclean interior 
of the cottage. 
She spent all the daytime lurking in a dusty, forlorn room at the top 
of the house which was a sort of museum of bric-a-brac dating from 
1880 onwards. 
     The PR and PM involve proximity; the spatial parts are maximally close 
to the wholes of which they are a spatial part of. So, there is a relational spatial 
concept between the PR and PM. However, this type of semantic relation 
between them sounds like the one between the two entities of typical PCs in 
a sense that there is a kind of relation that links the entities together. In fact, 
the concepts of relational space are so complex to an extent that the users do 
not have a certain nominalized structure to express these concepts through. 
Hence, the cognitive forces inside the minds of the speakers look for a 
concrete structural meaning to conceptualize the structure of relational spatial 
concepts through basic PC (Langacker, 1993). 
     According to Heine’s model  (1997a,1997b), relational spatial concepts 
have their original meaning from predicates whose original meaning has a lot 
to do with a Location and Accompaniment Schemas: the constructional 
schemas that people encounter on their daily basis and which they experience. 
The spatial notions ‘the interior’ and ‘the top’ are parts in an encyclopedic 
conceptual dominion for wholes. This makes sense for English, given the 
flexible semantics of possession. Both instances have roots from these 
constructional schemas, because of semantic affinity. When someone says “a 
cottage with an unclean interior”, “an unclean interior in the cottage” or “a 
house with a top”, “the top part in the house”, it is as if they describe a cottage 
having an unclean interior, or an interior located in the cottage, and that ‘the 
interior’ is an inseparable spatial part of ‘the cottage’, and is located close to 
it. So it is always seen with it. Thus, speakers perceive the aspects of similarity 
in meaning concerning ‘proximity’ and ‘being with’ in conceptualizing 
concepts of spatial parts. At the linguistic level in companion schema, ‘the 
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interior’ and ‘the top’ are the entities that accompany the wholes, which are 
the objects, and the wholes are accompanied by the entities, which are the 
subjects, and the predicate marks the possessive relation. In Location Schema, 
the PMs are conceptualized as being located in a close proximity of the PRs, 
and the PRs are conceptualized as the places where the PMs can be found. 
 
4.4.4 Inherent Parts of Other Items 
     The inherent parts are thought to represent the whole item, and the whole 
item is so informative to the conceptualization of the part. Consider the 
following examples extracted from 1935/2002 (pp.16-17): 
Dorothy drew a long glass-headed pin from the lapel of her coat, and 
furtively, under cover of Miss Mayfill’s back, pressed the point 
against her forearm. Her flesh tingled apprehensively. 
      There is a conceptual dependency between the two entities; a concept of 
‘the lapel’ of the item cannot be formed into a conceptualized structure till 
the item is known. There is a meronymic relation between the two entities. 
The wholes typically consist of many, perhaps even an indefinite number of 
both physical and abstract parts, and generally no one part has privileged 
status in the conceptualization of the wholes. Consequently, the wholes are 
highly suited to function as reference points and thus Landmarks (LM 
hereafter) for the identification of the parts, which are the trajector (TR 
hereafter).  
     There is a cognitive systematic way to account for almost all concepts 
which speakers have. In the two examples above, when someone says 
“Dorothy wore a coat with a lapel,” this basically gives the hearer a literal 
meaning that Dorothy’s coat has a lapel on it. This is the case because people 
through their experience of the notional ‘existence’ and ‘being with’ can 
readily presuppose that the descriptive sentences uttered are interpreted as ‘a 
coat designed with a lapel’. Indeed, this mainly gives a sense of 
‘togetherness’. The two constructions may be interpreted in overlapping but 
not necessarily identical ways depending on the exact semantic contribution 
of the Accompaniment Schema.  
 
4.4.5 Mental States and Attributes  
     In such concepts, the PMs are abstract properties and are semantically 
dependent on the PRs, that are the experiencers, that is, it is a requirement of 
the PMs that they be an abstract property of an individual. Thus, the abstract 
properties which are sometimes called stimulus represent the experiencer. 
The experience of a cognitive state is a better cue for the identification of the 
target than the stimulus that causes the cognitive state. A huge number of 
instances concerning this class have occurred through the texts. Below are 
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instances of this class shown from 1935/2002 (p.133) and 1935/2002 (p.203), 
respectively: 
Most of Dorothy’s agitation had disappeared by the time she reached 
the rectory. 
 
[In leaded type] Rumour, as yet unconfirmed, states that she was 
recently seen with a male companion in a hotel of evil repute in 
Vienna. 
     In Dorothy’s agitation, the experiencer ‘Dorothy’ serves as a reference 
point for the conceptualization of the stimulus ‘agitation’. In a hotel of evil 
repute, the attribute holder ‘a hotel’ has a high cue validity and intrinsicness 
to serve as a reference point for the identification and conceptualization of the 
attribute target ‘evil repute’. This is because it is natural to conceptualize a 
specific property in accordance with the holder, not the other way around 
(Taylor, 1996). In accordance with the intuitive understanding, these 
instances, too, are very closely related to possession. In some ways, an 
attribute is a means of identifying an individual and some possessions may 
also be the same. Moreover, some attributes e.g., a good figure, can be 
acquired as most possessions can too.  
     In Dorothy’s agitation, ‘agitation’ is an abstract noun. ‘Dorothy’ is 
involved in the kind of mental state in a way that one can notice and feel the 
existence of these mental qualities from her. Thus, the meaning and structure 
of these concepts are historically and originally taken from a concrete 
semantic structure of ‘something that exists from someone,’ or ‘there is a kind 
of attribute in someone,’ as well as a companion schema ‘being with someone 
or something’. ‘Dorothy’ can be with a companion of the ‘agitation’ since she 
is the holder and experiencer of this mental state. They may experience these 
many other times in their lives; so the state is with them. The original 
meanings of attributes come from physical descriptive structures, like “they 
built a hotel with evil repute”. Since speakers do not have certain structures 
for everything they may happen to want to talk about, they refer to more 
concrete concepts stored in their cognition to find the categorizing 
relationships between abstract concepts and the concept of the constructional 
schema, which is something outside the innateness of the set of formal rules. 
Thus, cognitivists declare that there is a systematic and natural way for the 
identification of concepts that grammar cannot reflect; this is done through 
the shared link of semantics between the two concepts (Taylor, 1996). 
 
4.4.6 Nominalizations: Verbal PM  
     Nominalization PCs are even further from typical possession than the 
other classes mentioned earlier from the possession gestalt. In expressing 
such concepts, the PMs are conceptually dependent on the PRs, that is, it is a 
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necessity of the PMs that they be an obligatory action and activity someone 
or something has undergone or is a participant in it. Instances are illustrated 
below from 1935/2002 (p.199) and 1935/2002 (p.362), respectively:  
When she got back to the hut, the other women were sitting up, talking 
excitedly about Nobby’s arrest. 
 
But she (Dorothy) realized, too, that if she began crying it would be 
the last straw and the parents would demand her dismissal. 
     The two instances are concepts denoting an event, and the deverbal nouns 
in these instances are called episodic nominalization. This is partly because 
the expressions tend to represent a single instance of the process, and also 
because the deverbal nouns naturally take the TR as PMs. In the instances 
above, the LMs ‘Nobby’ and ‘Dorothy’ are relatively more intrinsic to a 
conceptualization of the event than the TRs ‘arrest’ and ‘dismissal’ to the 
extent that the change in state of the LMs entity can be conceptualized 
relatively independently of its cause. Looking at the PC of ‘Nobby’s arrest’ 
one can propose that the PC is semantically indeterminate and context-
dependent, because the same phrase of deverbal PMs can convey a concept 
of a participant in an action. This is why the informativity of the reference 
point with respect to the target is not a fixed invariant property, but may be 
modified by various contextual circumstances (Taylor, 1996). 
     Most importantly, the semantics and structure of event concepts expressed 
by PC are originally derived from Topic Schema. The structure and meaning 
of this schema correspond to existential ‘be’ construction. Heine (1997b) 
claims that in order to understand why PCs are formed the way they are, there 
has to be a description of salient processes of conceptual transfer. Speakers 
form their experiences regarding the notion of existence, make a link between 
the meaning of the concept they want to express, and the semantics of the 
constructional schema. The meaning of her dismissal, is taken from ‘the 
existence of something’, like when somebody says “there is an act of 
dismissing Dorothy as far as she knows”, it is as if a speaker has said 
‘Dorothy’s dismissal’. ‘Dorothy’ serves as a possessive modifier by 
appearing in topic position. The possessive relationship is established by 
asserting the existence of ‘dismissal’ in relation to the topicalized ‘Dorothy’ 
(Heine, 1997a, 1997b). 
    
4.4.7 Other Individual Concepts 
     Inseparable concepts of human beings are non-prototypical instances of 
actual paradigmatic possession from the possession gestalt. An instance 
concerning this class is illustrated below from 1935/2002 (p.298): 
The accursed chance that Dorothy’s surname was the same as his 
own had made his life a misery for the past fortnight…. 
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     In expressing this concept, ‘surname’ as the PM, is semantically dependent 
on the PR. This implies that there is a conceptual dependency that the PM be 
an obligatory unique concept, that are specific and related only to humans, to 
represent the individuals, and the individuals are so intrinsic to the 
conceptualization of the specific concepts. This instance is originally taken 
from concrete concepts of Topic schema in a sense that there is a similarity 
relationship of meaning between the individual concept of ‘Dorothy’s 
surname’ and the notion of ‘existence’. The term ‘existential sentence’ is used 
to refer to a specialized or non-canonical construction which expresses a 
proposition about the existence or the presence of someone or something. As 
a result of their special structural and interpretive characteristics, existential 
sentences have offered a rich ground on which to test theories concerning the 
semantics of noun phrases. By the time ‘Dorothy’ has been given the 
‘surname’, she is a girl with a ‘surname’, and since she is called by it, as far 
as she is concerned, there is a ‘surname’; wherever she goes, she is called and 
recognized by the ‘surname’. So, the pragmatic sense of ‘there exists 
something as far as someone is concerned’ gives rise to the PCs conveying 
concepts related to humans, because speakers know from their knowledge of 
the world and experiences that ‘existence’ basically means ‘the thing that 
exists in real world’ (Heine, 1997a, 1997b). 
 
4.5 Uncategorized Possessive Constructions 
     There are some other concepts structuralized through typical PC that are 
uncategorized. These examples of cases cannot be put under any of the 
categories that Heine proposes. This includes cases of other instances he fails 
to categorize. The uncategorized PCs do not have their originality from the 
event schemas Heine proposes, but they are regarded as extremely marginal 
examples of typical PCs, and thus, have their originality from possession 
experiential gestalt. These uncategorized PCs are of four types of different 
semantic relations: description, measurement, temporal, and subject 
matter possessives. The first two instances of description possessives are 
taken from 1935/2002 (p.88): 
Dorothy took the bottle of Elliman’s embrocation and carefully 
anointed Mrs Pither’s large, grey-veined, flaccid legs. 
     The other example extracted from 1935/2002 (p.361) is of 
possessives of measure: 
….It was necessary that Mrs Creevy should give her  ‘talking to’ in 
front of the parents, so that they might feel that they were getting their 
money’s worth and be satisfied. 
     Another instance of uncategorized possessives are taken from 1935/2002 
(p.220) through the texts of the novel. It is of concepts of temporal 
possessives: 
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Deafie, her bin-mate, like herself, was picking against time, for it was the last 
money he would earn till next year’s hopping season came round. 
     Last but not the least, a considerable number of subject matter 
possessives have been detected through the texts of the novel, one of 
which is taken from 1935/2002 (p.90): 
 
It was that mystical joy in the beauty of the earth and the very nature 
of things that she recognized, perhaps mistakenly, as the love of God. 
     Some ideas of control, exclusivity, and perhaps a related idea of proximity 
may underlie the mapping. In the typical PC, at least, one can usually control 
what is nearby of one’s possessions, and the PMs in the above concepts are 
more close to a specific group of people or two related things that also have 
rights of access physically than other individuals or other things. In this sense, 
they are also more ‘controllable’. An onomastic example of Elliman’s 
embrocation indicates that it is not ‘Elliman’ who has an ‘embrocation’; 
rather, the phrase has become a conventionalized name for a kind of lotion, 
which is no longer identified with reference to the individual, ‘Elliman’; it is 
rather a kind of lotion named after ‘Elliman’. Likewise, in next year’s hopping 
season, the aspects of similarity are the exclusivity and proximity of the PR-
PM relation. The notion of ‘hopping season’ is identified in the sense of ‘next 
year’ and not as other times or days, it is exclusive to ‘next year, only, and 
are close to that time (Taylor, 1996). Consider also an example, like money’s 
worth. The sense of its semantic relation is analogues to the basic sense of 
relational possession in that they designate the relation between a thing and 
measurable property. The notion of exclusivity and relatedness between PR-
PM provides the conceptual link between the concept and the possession 
relation, in that ‘worth’ of something is talked about in the sense of ‘money’. 
It also mentions the value and worth related to money only and not to other 
things. Another instance is the use of genitive to express the concept of 
content e.g., open pots of paint illustrate a content-container relationship 
(Taylor, 1996). 
     If the metaphorical analysis is correct, the researcher has to identify 
directionality in the structuring of these meanings. According to Langacker 
(1993), the original meaning of basic PC starts out as more concrete 
(physically hold) from the possession gestalt and from there developed to 
more abstract and complex senses. The conceptual frames and domains of 
this basic PC motivate a natural systematic way of conceptualizing those 
concepts using the same genitive structure. This systematicity relies on a 
network of interrelated senses. The network is cognitive in nature, since it 
goes beyond the boundaries of a specific language, and consists of 
metaphorical links. Understanding other concepts as being a relation of 
possession involves being able to superimpose the multidimensional structure 
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of aspects of the concept of actual PC upon the corresponding structure of the 
four concepts mentioned above (Langacker 1987,1991). 
     Lackoff and Johnson (1980) explain that such multidimensional structures 
characterize experiential gestalts, which are ways of organizing experiences 
into structured wholes. This is where grammar comes to be conceptualized. 
In the two hours’ work, the gestalt for Mr Warburton’s car is structured 
further by means of correspondences with selected relations between the 
activity and the time during which the activity exists. Thus ‘a car’, ‘Mr 
Warburton’ owns, and ‘a work’ that lasts ‘two hours’, are understood in terms 
of another, that something physical belongs to someone, and this sense of 
‘belongingness’ motivates the process of conceptualizing the abstract and 
complex concept. Structuring people’s experience in terms of such 
multidimensional gestalts is what makes their experience coherent. People 
experience relations between the activity and the time during which the 
activity exists as relations of possession when the possession gestalt fits their 
perceptions and understandings in conversation. Thus, a concept fits 
experience, and helps in its conceptualization. 
 
5. The Findings 
Building on the theoretical issues raised as well as the practical 
section, the study comes up with the following findings: 
1. Possessive constructions cannot be accounted for by following only 
one model; Heine’s model is inadequate and fails to account for all 
the semantic relations expressed through possessive structure. There 
has to be more  models to capture the analysis fully. 
2. PCs are related to existential, locative, and companion constructions. 
This means that their relation is suggested by the fact that these 
constructions exhibit the same rule behavior in certain uses, because 
they are schemas in their underlying structure naturally. 
3. Event schemas serve as templates or metaphorical vehicles for 
referring to possession. 
4. The data collected from the novel, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 
below, incorporate the idea that linguistic possession does not always 
presuppose conceptual possession, but it motivates and gives rise to 
them. This is the reason why the number of occurrence for inalienable 
PCs is so much higher; and paradigmatic possession is not particularly 
frequent after all.  
5. One cannot claim that Elliman’s embrocation and Dorothy’s agitation 
are ‘less good English structures’ than Mr Warburton’s car and the 
Rector’s pipe. What is an issue is the productivity of the typical PCs. 
As the nominals diverge more and more from the prototype, 
productivity declines. This connotes that the acceptability of a given 
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possessive expression becomes increasingly subject to matters of 
frequency usage, and each instantiation of the construction has to be 
listed separately. In Table 2 below, it is illustrated that the occurrences 
of inalienable possessives in an authentic real language usage is 1,268 
expressions (=63 percent of the corpus), which is too high in 
comparison with an actual animate alienable possession relation, 
which includes 24% of the data. In addition, those concepts labeled 
uncategorized PCs, which Heine does not account for, consist of the 
lowest rate of only 13%. 
6. The aspect of the semantics of the genitive that both the homonymy 
and the abstractionist hypotheses of the two traditional approaches fail 
to capture is the “sense of relatedness” status of each of the genitive 
functions. More so, some of the inevitable implications of such 


















Figure 1. Percentage distribution of inalienable possessive constructions in  
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Table 2. The total number of occurrences for PCs in A Clergyman’s Daughter 













1. Animate Alienable Possessives 
2. Unowned Alienable Possessives 267 13% 
3. Inanimate Alienable Possessives 21 1% 





1. Kinship Terms 
2. Body-Parts 76 4% 
3. Relational Spatial Concepts 66 3% 
4. Inherent Parts of other Items 508  25% 
5. Mental States & Attributes 331 16% 
6. Nominalizations 69 3% 
7. Other individual Concepts 173 9% 





 1. Description Possessives 
2. Possessives of Measure 28 1% 
3. Temporal Possessives 43 2% 
4. Possessives of Subject Matter 133 7% 
Total Possessive Construction Count:                                                  (2012) 
 
Conclusion 
  The study arrived at the fact that there are certain cases which Heine 
himself could not subsume under any of the heading of categories of 
inalienable possessions. He calls them “OTHER”, apart from those 
uncategorized PCs to which he even could not account for. No possessive 
structure comes out arbitrarily; every single meaning of linguistic structures 
to satisfy communicative needs have a natural semantic source that helps 
shape the structure.  
  It is observed that people cannot just think of language as a more or 
less rigid and stable structure; they, instead, should think of those structures 
as flexible extra-linguistic in nature. Event schemas provide a convenient way 
of conceptualizing recurrent types of experiences, they are extremely useful 
for communication; and they are ideal for expressing what people think, feel, 
and want. Most of all, they provide convenient templates for describing 
abstract contents as possession. In fact, the way PCs are structuralized and the 
meanings they convey are all the products of human mind, and not a product 
of a set of inborn formal rules. Since the semantic networks associated with 
morphemes are open, new phenomenon can be assimilated to existing 
categories on the basis of perceived similarities. Humans have their cognition 
to provide the more natural and systematic linguistic patterns through 
conceptual integration of linguistic units. 
486                
24% 
1268                
63% 
258                
13% 
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  The study also showed that there is no prototypical system of rules for 
each and every possessive complex semantic relation. That is why grammar 
alone does not suffice to explain human linguistic structures. Instead, linguists 
must look at the individual phrases of speaker’s expressions to understand 
their contribution to the semantics of the entire phrase containing them.  
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